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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
DALE S. PIERRE, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-vs- Case No. 16169 
LAWRENCE MORRIS, as Warden of 
the Utah State Prison, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant petitioned for a post-conviction writ 
of habeas corpus in the Third Judicial District Court to 
which respondent moved to dismiss. The Honorable James S. 
Sawaya granted respondent's motion and dismissed the 
petition with prejudice. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LO\·IER COURT 
The Court below heard oral arguments on the 
respondent's motion to dismiss and thereafter granted the 
motion on November 30, 1978, and also denied appellant's 
motion for a stay of execution. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmation of the judgments 
and order of the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 15, 1974, appellant was found guilty 
by a jury of three counts of murder in the first degree 
and two counts of aggravated robbery. The gruesome facts 
surrounding the crimes were previously recited to this 
Court on appellant's and his co-defendant's direct appeals in 
State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338 (Utah 1977); and State v. 
Andrews, 572 P.2d 709 (Utah 1977). See also the Statement· 
of Facts in the State of Utah's brief in opposition to 
appellant's petition for certiorari in Pierre v. State, 
United States Supreme Court No. 77-6583, cert. denied, October 
2, 1978, which is part of the record on appeal in the 
instant case. 
After a bifurcated sentencing hearing, the jury 
determined that appellant's case was a proper case for the 
imposition of the death penalty, and appellant was 
sentenced to death by shooting at the Utah State Prison. 
Appellant and his co-defendant took direct appeals 
to the Utah Supreme Court ruising constitutional challenges 
to their convictions and sentences. This Court subsequently 
affirmc=ci the convictions anc1 sentences in State _':'_.:__!'_ierre, 
-2-
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supra, and State v. Andrews, supra. Motions for a rehearing 
of the appeals were made by appellant and his co-defendant 
without supporting authorities, and these motions were 
subsequently denied by this Court. 
On or about April 14, 1978, appellant petitioned 
the United States Supreme Court for writ of certiorari and 
the State filed a brief in opposition to his petition. 
(These pleadings were made part of proceedings before Judge 
Sawaya and are also part of the record on appeal in the 
instant case). On October 2, 1978, the petition for 
writ of certiorari was denied by the high court. 
On or about November 28, 1978, appellant filed a 
petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Third Judicial 
District Court, and also applien for a stay of his execution 
which was then set for December 7, 1978. Again, he raised 
numerous constitutional challenqes to his conviction and 
sentence. Significantly, in his petition, appellant also 
sought an order from the court granting him authority to 
obtain subpoenas in forma pauoeJis for witnesses and 
documents necessary to prove the facts alleged in his 
petition and for an additional sixty days after the 
completion o: any hearing on his petition to brief the 
issues of law raised in his pPtition. The clear implication 
-3-
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of these requests is that petitioner had neither ascertained 
the facts nor the controlling law to support his legal claims 
when he filed his petition despite the fact that he had had 
approximately one year to do so from the date his conviction 
was affirmed by the Utah Supreme Court. 
Accordingly, respondent filed a motion to dismiss 
the petition on November 29, 1978, alleging that (1) 
petitioner could not, by writ of habeas corpus, raise issues 
that were or could have been raised in his direct appeal to 
the Utah Supreme Court; (2) prosecutorial discretion in 
charging a capital felony is permissible under recent rulings 
of the United States Supreme Court; and (3) all issues 
raised by petitioner were addressed in prior pleadings sub-
mitted by the State in prior proceedings and adequately 
dispose of petitioner's issues on the merits. (Such pleadings 
were annexed to respondent's motion to dismiss). 
Respondent's motion to dismiss and appellant's 
application for a stay of execution came on for hearing on 
No\·ember 30, 1978. Appellant expressed no objection to the 
hearing proceeding on November 30th (Hearing Transcript of 
November 30, 1978, at 3, 5). After full argument, Judge 
Sawaya commented from the bench that he had reviev1ed the 
Utah Supreme Court's rulings on appellant's and his co-
defendant's direct appeals, und said, "it seems to mP 
-4-
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that it [the cases] covers nearly every issue that could 
possibly be raised in a capital case except the one ••• 
on the question of whether or not the death sentence ia belaq 
imposed in a fair manner." (Hearing Transcript of llovellber 
30, 1978, at 32). However, on that latter issue, Judge 
Sawaya commented as follows: 
One thing that disturbs me is the fact 
that, regardless of our feeling about capital 
punishment, it seems that what you [appellants] 
are urging is that in any situation where an 
individual is convicted and sentenced to death 
I guess we should wait over a few years period and 
see whether or not there are others that are so 
convicted and sentenced and then if it is 
not being imposed on an equal pattern then the 
man should have a stay and should have a new 
trial or something. I'm not sure that I buy 
th,,t theory but I'm willing to give it SOllie 
consideration. I'm not sure that I have a right 
to even voice an opinion about it. The question 
is whether or not there is a new issue that 
should be considered and the only one that 
I can see is the one involving prosecutorial 
discretion as it affects the imposition of 
the death penalty so I'll consider it and I'll 
have you a ruling probably about noon today. 
(T. 32). 
It should be noted that earlier in the hearing, respondent 
referred the court to his legal analysis of the issue of 
prosecutorial discretion in charging capital offenses 
contained at pages six and seven of his memorandum in support 
of his motion to dismiss, and argued that the issue was one 
that could be disposed of as a matter of law because the 
claim had previously been raised to and rejected by the 
United States supreme Court in prior capital cases (T.26). 
-5-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Later on November 30, 1978, Judge Sawaya issued 
a memorandum decision granting respondent's mo~ion to dismiss 
and concluding as follows: 
It is the opinion of the Court that the 
Petition For Writ of Habeas Corpus filed 
herein raised no issue of fact or law material 
to determination of the legality and consti-
tutionality of the conviction, confinement 
or sentence of the Petitioner which were not 
raised or could not have been raised on appeal 
to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
(R.ll8). 
He also signed an order on November 30, 1978, granting 
respondent's motion which read as follows: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that respondent's 
motion to dismiss petitioner's petition for 
a writ of habeas corpus is granted on the 
ground that all issues raised in petitioner's 
petition were known or should have been known 
at the time petitioner took his direct appeal 
from his conviction to the Utah Supreme Court, 
and all issues either were raised or could have 
been raised•on that appeal, and habeas corpus 
may not be used to relitigate appealed issues 
or to raise issues which could have been raised 
on appeal. Maguire v. Smith, 547 P.2d 696 (Utah 19761 
Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 440 P.2d 968 
(1968); and Bryant v. Turner, 19 Utah 2d 284, 
431 P.2d 121 (1967). Accordingly, petitioner's 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus is dismissed 
with prejudice, and petitioner's application for 
a stay of execution is denied. (R. 119-120). 
Finally, o~ December 4, 1978, Judge Sawaya entered 
the following findings of fact and conclusions of law: 
1. No developments of fact or law material 
to the determination of the legality and 
constitutionality of the conviction and 
sentence of the Petitioner herein have occurred 
since the filing of Petitioner's direct appeal to 
the Utah Supreme Court and that Court's decision 
on that appeal. 
-(,-
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2. All the issues regarding the 
constitutionality of the processes for 
death sentences under Utah law, the 
constitutionality of the death sentence in 
Petitioner's case, and the effect of any 
alleged prejudicial publicity or influences 
on Petitioner's trial which are raised or 
could have been raised by this Petition 
are the same issues that Petitioner raised 
in his direct appeal to the Utah Supreme 
Court. 
3. Petitioner's claim that Utah's 
death penalty law is being applied 
arbitrarily and discriminatorily fails 
to state a claim on which relief could be 
granted or on which a hearing need be held. 
Moreover, petitioner could and should have 
raised such issue on direct appeal. 
4. Constitutional issues identical to 
those raised and decided on direct appeal 
cannot be raised again in collateral 
proceedings. 
5. Constitutional challenges to the 
pattern of application of a crimin~l statute 
or the excessiveness of a criminal sentence 
which were not but could have been raised 
through collateral proceedings. (R. 124-125). 
From the above rulings, appellant now brings this 
ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
Two cases currently pending before this Court, 
Pierre v. Morris, Sup. Ct. No. 16169 (the instant case), 
and Andrews v. Morris, Sup. Ct. No. 16168, are so closely 
related to one another that special consideration by this 
Court would seem to be warranted. In an attempt to 
further judicial efficiency without sacrificing justice 
-7-
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and fairness, respondent has structured his brief in the 
instant case in such a fashion as to incorporate by 
reference much of the material included in respondent's 
brief in Andrews v. Morris. Given the similarity of the 
issues raised by the appellants in the two cases, respondent 
feels that the quality of legal argument is not sacrificed 
by this procedure. Counsel for appellant Pierre have been 
served with copies of the brief of respondent in Andrews v. 
Morris. 
Most importantly, respondent urges the Court to 
read the brief of respondent in Andrews v. Morris before 
reading the brief of respondent in the instant case. In 
this sequence, the arguments made by respondent will be 
presented in a clear, logical order. 
-8-
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POINT I. 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY INVOKED A 
DOCTRINE OF WAIVER THAT IS UNIQUE TO 
POST-CONVICTION HABEAS CORPUS CASES AND 
CORRECTLY DISMISSED ISSUES THAT COULD 
OR SHOULD HAVE BEEN RAISED ON DIRECT 
APPEAL OF APPELLANT'S CONVICTION. 
As discussed in detail in Point IV.,~., 
issues raised by a post-conviction habeas corpus petitioner 
that could or should have been raised in a direct appeal 
from his conviction may not be raised in a post-conviction 
petition for writ of habeas corpus. This result is 
obtained through the use of a doctrine of waiver that has 
historically been enforced by the Utah courts by means 
of case law and special rules of procedure (Rule 65B(i), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure) that limit the availability 
of the writ. Without overcoming the initial hurdle of 
showing that the issues raised in a post-conviction 
petition could not have been raised on direct appeal, a 
petitioner's claims are the proper subjects of a motion 
to dismiss as a matter of law for failure to state a 
claim as set forth in Rule 65B(i). Respondent submits 
that appellant's petition in Third District Court was 
fatally defecti\c for the reasons that (J) it attempted 
to raise issues that had been raisrd previously in the 
direct appeal of appellant's conviction, (2) it attempted 
··'! 
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to raise issues that could or should have been raised in 
that appeal and (3) it raised issues that could be disposed 
of as a matter of law pursuant to the authority of the 
Third District Court. Appellant's efforts to remove 
issues from the scope of the lower court's ruling are 
unpersuasive for the reasons which follow. 
A. 
APPELLANT MAY NOT SIMPLY RE-FRANE 
ISSUES THAT WERE DECIDED ON DIRECT 
APPEAL AND CHARACTERIZE THEH AS A 
NOVEL, NEWLY-DISCOVERED BASIS FOR 
A POST-CONVICTION WRIT OF HABEAS 
CORPUS. 
Appellant summarizes four categories of issues 
that assertedly form the basis for his Third District Court 
petition, the firstofwhich includes "issues raised in 
appellant's petition (which) resulted from this court's 
decision in State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338 (Utah 1977)". 
Brief of appellant at 4. Respondent submits that rather 
than arising from this Court's decision in Pierre (and, 
therefore according to appellant, impossible to include 
as part of the direct appeal itselt), the "new issues" 
are merely restatements of the old jssues with additional 
focus on the particular aspects of tho~;e old issues 
highlighted by this Court's opinion. An attempt to simply 
re-frame old issues should be dismissl'd under the 
authority of Utah statute and case law w!Jich prevents the 
relitigation 
petitioner. 
-10-
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Rule 65B(i)(2) requires that a petitioner state 
whether the issues raised in the instant petition have been 
previously litigated in "a prior habeas corpus or other 
similar proceeding." While this section is directed at 
collateral proceedings rather than a direct appeal, the policy 
of attempting to preclude relitigation of the same issues is 
clear. Moreover, Rule 65B(i) (2) also requires the petitioner 
to state whether he took an appeal and, if so, identify the 
appellate proceedings and state the results thereof. The 
clear purpose of this requirement is to aid courts in 
determining the applicability of the waiver doctrine 
established by this Court in case law. The situation occurring 
in the instant case is disposed of by that Utah case law. 
Numerous cases have held that a habeas corpus petitioner 
may not relitigate issues that he raised on direct appeal from 
his conviction. See,~, Bennett v. Smith, 547 P.2d 696 
(Utah 1977); Oniskor v. Smith, 540 P.2d 519 (Utah 1975). 
The strong state policy of avoiding duplicative litigation 
should prevent appellant from bootstrapping from old 
issues to "new issues" by means of semantical manipulation. 
A review of the issues raised by appellant in this first 
category reveals their true nature and their vulnerability 
to the above-discussed waiver doctrine. 
At page 5 of his brief, appellant states tha~ 
essentially five issues arose out of this Court's decision 
:__;·-,n ten~ intJ 
( 2) "tile 
(l) "discretion that the 
authority has in imposing the death penalty," 
. . t. of the aggravating nec·d for c;peclfl<'il 1on · 
, 1 1 , • : 1.c; t _l nee.-~ \.\dl ich allth ~rity found to exist," the sente:ncing · 
ll 
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(3) "the quidanc~ qiven to the sentencing authority in 
reaching the decision of whether or not to impose the 
death penalty," (4) "the nature and s;cope of appellate 
review in capital cases," and ( 5) "Issues with respect to 
the burden of proof to be applied at the sentencing phase." 
Issues (1), (3), (4), and (5) were disposed of by this Court's 
opinion in Pierre. 
Issue number (1), discretion of the sentencing 
authority, was raised in Point I of appellant's original 
(as opposed to his Amended Brief filed some time later 
with the Court), Brief in his direct appeal (Exh. "A") wherein 
appellant states: "However, at the time of sentencing the 
judge or jury is left with complete discretion to decide 
whether to impose the death sentence." Appellant 
argued this point in his brief and the opinion of Justice 
Wilkins in Pierre expressly dismissed the merits of the 
argument. It is fair to state that while the opinion of 
Justice Wilkins in Pierre focused on the issues raised by 
appellant in that case, the opinion was sufficiently 
t~oro~gh in deali~g ~ith all the issues concerning Utah's 
death penalty that it disposed of any subtle nuances 
deriveJ fr"-rt the original arguments of appellant. 
Issue number (3), ']Uidance given to the sentencing 
authority, is a rec';otatc;l\l'nt upon c1 restiltCTn':.>nt of an old 
-12-
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issue. It is duplicative of issue number (1), above, and is 
also dealt with by this Court's opinion in Pierre. 
Issue number (4), the nature and scope of 
appellate review in capital cases, was raised by appellant 
in Point I of his Amended Brief (Exh."B"). Again, this 
issue was disposed of by the opinion on direct appeal. 
Issue number (5), the burden of proof at the 
sentencing phase, appeared as Point XII of appellant's 
Amended Brief. At the risk of soundinq repetitive, 
this claim was also decided on direct appeal. 
The writ of habeas corpus may not be used to serve 
as a second appeal. Oniskor v. Smith, supra. The 
instant case is a prime example of the reasons behind 
cases like Oniskor. This Court should not be 
required to re-examine old issues that it has previously 
addressed simply because an unsuccessful appellant is 
dissatisfied with the Court's opinion or decides that he 
subsequently has formulated another, hopefully more 
?ersuasive, Hay o£' re-arguing the sa-ne point. Judicial 
''conomy demands that appellate courts assume this posture 
with regard to issues previously litigated. 
Issue number (2), the specification of aggravating 
circumstwnces which t~.c scnt0ncinq authority found to 
r'xist, WLIS not arc;w'J in ~;ucll a fashion as to be as clearly 
di"['''>secl of by the [ll'.Lcll' opinJon in Pierre_. Nevertheless, 
lhr> arqumcnt is willuuL lcqal merit. See No. 16168, 
-13-
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Point IV., p. 63 to 67. (Due to the length of 
respondent's briefs in the instant case and in Andrews 
v. Morris, Sup. Ct. No. 16168, and the similarity of the 
facts and legal argument in both cases, respondent requests 
leave of this Court to incorporate certain portions of 
respondent's brief in Andrews v. Morris by reference to 
this case in the interest of efficiency. The case of 
Andrews v. Morris will be referred to herein as "No. 
16168" for the sake of brevity and clarity) . 
The ruling of Judge Sawaya dismissing appellant's 
Third District Court petition reflects his finding that 
appellant was attempting to raise issues that had been 
raised and decided on direct appeal of appellant's conviction: 
[t)he Court now makes the following 
findings and conclusions: 
2. All the issues regarding the 
constitutionality of the processes for 
death sentencing under Utah law, the 
constitutionality of the death sentence 
in Petitioner's case, and the effect 
of any alleged prejudicial publicity 
or influences on Petitioner's trial 
w'·1ich are raised by this Petition are 
tr.e sa:-"e iss:..:es that Petitioner raiSed 
or could iluve raised in his direct 
appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. (R. 159) 
(emphasis added). 
Appellant failed to shu..; sufficient originality of the 
issues at tlw district court lc1·cl o.nd his efforts to do so 
on appeal o.rc unpcrsu~c. i1·c. 
-14-
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B. 
RECENT UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
DECISIONS ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
DO NOT EFFECT APPELLANT'S CONVICTION 
AND SENTENCE. 
Appellant's second contention on this Point is 
that various capital punishment cases decided by the 
United States Supreme Court during the period from 1976 
to 1978 have an impact on appellant's conviction that 
merits consideration in an evidentiary hearing. The 
cases were decided by the Supreme Court in three basic 
time periods relevant to appellant's direct appeal: (1) 
after appellant had submitted his original brief but before 
the State had filed its brief; (2) aftertheState had filed 
its brief but before the decision of this Court was 
rendered on November 25, 1977; and (3) after the decision 
by this Court in State v. Pierre, supra, but before 
the inception of the instant petition. Primary emphasis is 
placed by appellant upon cases in the latter two categories. 
Respondent submits that appellant's argument must fail on 
this point as well because (l) the cases in the first 
ti~e period were fully briefed and argued by both parties 
by means of appellant's Amended Brief, respondent's Brief 
and oral argument before this Court; therefore, this 
Court's opinion in Pierre was issued with recognition of 
those cases; (2) appellant waived the opportunity to 
-15-
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argue the cases in the second time period in his petition 
by failing to raise them to this Court on his direct 
appeal by means of supplementing his brief or by raising 
them in a petition for rehearing. Furthermore, as will be 
shown infra, the arguments are unavailing on their merits, and 
(3) appellant has failed to demonstrate that the cases in 
the third time period warrant retroactive application or 
that they are controlling of the instant case on their 
merits. 
The cases in the first time period include ~ 
v. Georgia, 428 U.S.l53 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 
U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); 
(Stanislaus) Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); 
and Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). As 
shown by the briefs of the parties on direct appeal and the 
opinion of this Court, these cases were before the Court 
prior to the decision filed on November 25, 1977; thus, these 
cases may not be argued again and appellant suffered no 
prejudice by the ti~e sequence of their issuance in 1976. 
Gc.rdncr v Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977); (Harry) 
Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1977); and Coker v. 
Geo_r_gia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), are the thrcce cases included 
ln the second time perioJ, after thP state had filed its 
brief but before tiliS c,-,urt filc'cl its J0cision in Pierre 
-lG-
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on November 25, 1977. It is significant to note that 
Gardner was decided by the Supreme Court on March 22, 1977, 
(Harry) Roberts, on June 6, 1977, and,Coker on June 29, 
1977. Respondent submits that these precise dates are 
important in considering the ~lternatives open to appellant 
if he had exercised diligence in informing this Court of 
the law germane to his appeal. 
When Gardner, (Harry) Roberts and Coker were 
decided in the interval between the filing of appellant's 
Amended Brief on November 8, 1976, and this Court's decision 
on November 25, 1977, appellant could and should have 
briefed this Court on the significance of these cases in 
either of two ways: (1) by invoking Rule 75(p) (3), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows for authorities not 
uncovered before oral argument on the appeal to be 
submitted to this Court by mail in order to supplement the 
party's brief, or (2) by including the argument in a 
brief in support of a petition for rehearing, Rule 76(e) 
(l), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The dates on which 
the three casesweredecided allowerl appellant some five months 
in which to submit them to this Court prior to its decision, 
and the cases could clearly have oeen argued in a petition 
for rehearing. This type of siL,,~tion is exactly the type 
contemplated by the provision for rehearing and appellant 
shotild have invoked this available remedy. While appellant 
·l I · 
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could not have known when this Court would issue its 
decision in Pierre, supra, responsible appellate 
advocacy demands that the parties fulfill their roles as 
officers of the court and inform the court upon discovery 
of cases of this magnitude. Therefore, respondent maintains 
that appellant may not argue these cases in a petition for 
writ of habeas corpus because he could and should have 
raised the issues as part of his direct appeal. However, 
given the nature of the importance of all case law in the 
area of capital punishment, respondent shall discuss these 
cases in order to exhibit their inapplicability to the 
instant case. 
Appellant has failed to argue in detail the impact 
of (Harry) Roberts,supra, on this particular point and 
respondent would concur in this implicit statement that 
the case is inapposite. (Harry) Roberts is fully 
distinguishable from this case in that it involved a 
mandatory death sentence for the murder of a police officer 
under a Louisiana statute that did not permit the consideratic 
of particularized nitigating factors. 
question in the instant case. 
~either issue is in 
Gardner, ~~· i.e; arguecl by appellant primo.rily 
for the proposition that Utol1's sentencing system is 
defective because it does not provide for adequate pleading 
-18-
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at 7. This point is rebutted by respondent in No. 16168 
at p. 58-63, where respondent's argument is essentially 
that the nature of Utah's bifurcated procedure in 
capital cases operates to puta defendant on notice of 
the aggravating circumstances to be relied upon by the 
jury in the sentencing phase by the specific focus of the 
aggravating circumstances at the guilt phase. This is 
comparable to Texas' system upheld in Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 
(1976). As a result of the charges in the Information filed by the 
prosecution, the conduct of the trial and the jury 
instructions submitted to the jury, the defendant has 
sufficient notice of the aggravating circumstances relied 
upon in order to support a death sentence. Gardner, on 
the other hand, involved the use of secret information 
by the trial judge in overruling a jury recommendation 
of life imprisonment and an inadequate record on appeal, 
both distinguishable facts from this case. 
Coker, supra, is asserted by appellant to have 
est~blished a "test'' that assesses the evolving standards of 
decency in this country and is, allegedly, grounds for 
scrutinizing the validity of Utah's means of imposing the death 
penalty by shooting or hanging. Respondent contends 
that Coker did not purport to establish any "test" and 
in no way can be extended from its foundation of finding 
t11o doath penalty for rape of an adult woman disproportionate 
-19-
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to appellant's conclusion that the~ of imposing the 
death penalty are subject to the disproportionality 
analysis. The Coker Court did not attempt to fashion a 
broad test of disproportionalit~ but rather embarked on 
an in-depth review of the nationwide legislative 
reiectinn of the death penalty as a punishment for the 
crime of rape of an adult woman: 
[I]n ~regc;, after gi\·ing due 
regard to such sources, the Court's 
judgment was that the death penalty 
for deliberate murder was neither the 
purposeless imposition of severe 
punishment nor a punishment 
grossly disproportionate to the 
crime. But the Court reserved the 
question of the constitutionality of 
the death penalty when imposed for other 
crimes. 428 U.S. 187 n. 35. That 
question, with respect to rape of 
an adult woman is now before us. We have 
concluded that a sentence of death is 
grossly disproportionate and excessive 
punishment for the crime of rape and is 
therefore forbidden by the Eighth 
Amendment as cruel and unusual punishmcn t. 
433 U.S. at 592. 
The Court's holdi~g is limited to the disproportionality 
of the sentence of death to the crime of rape of an adult 
womun. Appcllan t' s suggestion of il "test" is further 
discrec1iteJ by L!ust:ice Po~>'c]l's comment: 
-211-
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[I]t is not this Court's function 
to formulate the relevant criteria that 
might distinguish aggravated rape from 
the more usual case, but perhaps a 
workable test would embrace the factors 
identified by Georgia: the cruelty or 
viciousness of the offender, the 
circumstances and manner in which the 
offense was committed, and the con-
sequences suffered by the victim. 
Id. at 602 n.l. 
There is not one scintilla of even dictum that suggests 
that the United States Supreme Court's holding in Wilkerson 
v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1879), upholding execution by hanging and 
shooting, is subject to challenge. Respondent asserts that 
shooting and hanging remain constitutionally permissible 
means of imposing the death penalty and that Coker has no 
material affect upon appellant's conviction or sentence. 
See also, No. 16168, p. 72-73 and Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 
578 F.2d 582 6161 ('.>th Cir. 1978), cert. denied 
u.s. (March 26, ]979), finding electrocution a 
constitutionally permissible method of execution. 
Cases in the third time period, after State v. 
Pierre was decided, include Lockett v. Ohio, ---u.s. 
98 S.Ct. 2954 (1978), Bell v. Ohio, u.s. ___ , 98 
S.Ct. 2977 (1978), an~ now arguably a third case which 
appellant has faileo to cite, Presnell v. Georgia, 
u.s. , 58 L.Ecl 7cJ 20"1 (1978). Appellant argues, as per 
Locke!_!: and Dell, thai- h"cause appellant was allegedly 
ncvC"r sp 0 cifically fo11nr" to have taken life nor intended 
to tdkc life, the j,,, ,> .. ilion of the death penalty is 
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improper. Brief of appellant at 8. (Respondent will 
discuss ~snell separately). Respondent's counter to 
the Lockett-Bell argument is discussed in detail in 
No. 16168 at p. 67-70 ; it is basically that (1) the cases 
are distinguishable from the instant case because of the 
differing degree of involvement in the murders by the respect~ 
defendants and (2) the instant case is not an imposition of 
a "purely vicarious theory of liability." 98 S.Ct. at 2972 
(Justice Marshall, concurring). The conduct of appellant 
in the instant case, involving a series of murders and 
bizarre conduct that amounted to torture of the victims, 
can hardly be ignored to the extent that appellant argues 
that the jury never found that he took life or intended to 
take life. Appellant's acts speak for themselves, and the 
jury's finding of guilt of murder in the first degree under 
one of the statutory aggravating circumstances of intentional 
murder was sufficient finding that appellant intended to take 
and did take the lives of his victims. 
In Presnell v. Georgia, suora, the Supreme Court 
found that the de~enda~t had no notice whatsoever of the 
grounds upon which the state was relying to prove the 
requisite aggravating circumstance. The Georgia Supreme 
Court found evider1ce of an aggravating cricu:nstancc on 
-22-
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appeal from a review of the entire record, but no such 
circumstance was ever expressly proved or found at trial. 
Thus, the defendant was denied any opportunity to rebut the 
State's case before it was submitted to the jury during 
the sentencing phase. Presnell is distinguished by the 
same reasoning urged by respondent inregard to Gardner v. 
Florida, supra. Additional argument concerning Presnell 
is set forth in No. 16168 at p. 60-61. In short, respondent 
maintains that the specificityof the Information filed 
by the prosecution charging the offenses of first degree 
murder, the jury instructions and the course of the trial 
were adequate notice to appellant of the aggravating 
circumstances relied upon by the state and found by the 
jury in support of a death sentence. 
To summarize, respondent submits that the 
decisions of the United States Supreme Court in the 
cases discussed above do not carry sufficient precedential 
weight to affect the validity of appellant's conviction 
and sentence. Each Supreme Court case in the line of 
Gardner, (Harry) Roberts, Coker, Lockett, Bell, and Presnell 
arises in a factual context that is clearly distinguishable 
from the instant case. None of the cases presents a new 
significant test that departs from the basic premises and 
requirements of Furman and the Cregg-Proffitt-Jurek trilogy, 
under which this Court found and should continue to find 
-23-
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Utah's death penalty procedure sound and appellant's 
conviction and sentence immune to attack. 
c. 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED 
CLAIMS AS A MATTER OF LAW DESPITE 
APPELLANT'S ATTEMPT TO CHARACTERIZE 
THEM AS FACTUAL IN NATURE. 
Appellant asserts that three of his claims made 
to the District Court were factual in nature and required 
an evidentiary hearing before they could be ruled upon: 
(1) the pattern and practice of prosecution of capital 
felonies in Utah and the United States which is allegedly 
arbitrary and discriminatory; (2) the arbitrary and 
capricious imposition of the death penalty because of 
"unlin.ited discretion in the sentencing authority" and 
(3) the arbitrary and discriminatory prosecution of capital 
cases because of race and poverty. Respondent submits that 
these claims were•properly dismissed as matters of law and 
did not require any factual determination. 
The assertion that questions of fact exist 
may be dismissed by a court if in reality the factual 
assertions merely color what is essentially a legal issue. 
Spinkellink v. \~ainwright, 578 F.2d 582, 590-91, (5th Cir. 
1978), cert. denied, u.s. (March 26, 1979). In 
Spinkellink, the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals stated: 
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When, however, it affirmatively 
appears from the petition that a 
petitioner is not entitled to the 
writ, an evidentiary hearing is 
unnecessary • • • For example, if a 
petitioner's habeas corpus allegations 
raise legal questions only, a district 
court's refusal to hold an evidentiary 
hearing does not violate the directives 
of Townsend (Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 
293 (1963)) or Section 2254 (d) ••• 
This rule would also apply when a trial 
court holds an inadequate evidentiary 
hearing, for if only questions of law 
are involved, an evidentiary hearing to 
develop fully the facts underlying a 
petitioner's complaints would be 
pointless. 
578 F. 2d 590, (citations omitted). 
Appellant's claim that the pattern and practice of 
prosecution of capital cases is improper was correctly 
excluded by Judge Sawaya as an issue that could have been 
raised on appeal and thus be dismissed as a matter of law. 
Moreover, respondent's memorandum to the lower court (R. 146) 
traced the roots of this argument to Gregg v. Georgia, supra, 
and demonstrated to the court's satisfaction that the 
issues was rejected by the United States Supreme Court 
and thus could be rejected by Judge Sawaya as a matter of 
law as well as on the waiver doctrine theory. 
Ap?ellant's second "factual issue" is a third 
restatement of the argument that the jury is afforded too 
much discretion in the sentencing phase. This argument 
has been discussed supra, p. 12-13 . Despite the fact that 
appellant and his co-defendant were the first to be 
convicted under Utah's latest capital punishment provisions, 
the claim of discrir.1ination because of jury discretion could 
l!ct,·c' l.wcn ::uclc .:md supportC'd with data available at the 
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time of the direct appeal. Under appellant's reasoning, 
no clear date could be established as a cut-off for the corn-
~ilAtion of such data because each death sentence, execution or 
decision of a capital case in general would add to the 
open-ended analysis and prevent an execution from ever being 
carried out. This approach was expressly rejected as being 
unworkable in Spinkellink, supra, at 604-606. Moreover, 
appellant was required to support this claim with sufficient 
information to comply with Rule 65B(i). He failed to do so, 
either in his pleadings or his argument on respondent's motion 
to dismiss, and thus the issue was properly dismissed as a 
matter of law. 
The third clai~ on this point concerns the 
questions of race and poverty and the alleged discriminatory 
application of the death penalty. This claim is discussed 
at length in No. 16168. This very issue was 
disposed of as a matter of law in Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 
578 F.2d 582,614-616 (5th Cir. 1978), cert denied u.s. 
(March 26, 1979). Spinkellink should be followed by 
t:his Court. 
D. 
A SUSPENSION OF THE IMPOSITION OF TilE 
DEATH PENALTY PENDING AN EXAMINATION 
OF STUDIES DY COrtr·lENTATORS AND 
COUNSEL \~OULD FRUST!V\TE THE USE OF 
A VALID CRIMINAL SANCTION. 
Appellant, in an effort to excus0 his failure to 
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state of the law with respect to capital punishment in the 
United States is very technical and some issues simply 
were not apparent until the law had been extensively studied 
by commentators and counsel." Brief of appellant at 5. 
At the hearing on respondent's motion to dismiss, Judqe 
Sawaya stated: 
One thing that disturbs me is the 
fact that, regardless of our feeling about 
capital punishment, it seems that what 
you are urging is that in any situation 
where an individual is convicted and 
sentenced to death I guess we should 
wait over a few years period and see 
whether or not there are others that are 
so convicted and sentenced and then if it 
is not being imposed on an equal pattern 
then the man should have a stay and should 
have a new trial or something. I'm not 
sure I buy that theory but I'm willing 
to give it some consideration. 
(Trans. November 30, 1978 at 32). 
Judge Sawaya subsequently rejected appellant's theory. 
Appellant's argument on this issue suffers from 
the defect suggested by Judge Sawaya: under appellant's 
argument, there is no definite time which would mark an 
end ~o the consideration of a capital sentence. Each 
ne· .. , case would arguably require a reconsideration of the 
prior sentence and conviction. Spinkellink, supra, expressly 
rejected this type of "wait and see" approach. 578 F.2d 582, 
613-614. 
In conclusion, respondent maintains that appellant 
has fLJilccl to raise an issue that is not precluded as a 
matter oL l<H·J or !Jy utah's habeas corpus l·:aiver doctrine. 
-27-
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Furthermore, the claims are without merit as applied 
to the inst~nt case and should be dismissed by this Court. 
-lG-
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POINT II. 
THE BURDEN AND STANDARD OF PROOF REQUIRED 
IN UTAH CAPITAL SENTENCING PROCEDURES 
DOES NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY SHIFT THE 
BURDEN OF PROOF TO THE DEFENDANT, ALLOW 
FOR UNGUIDED SENTENCING DISCRETION, OR 
MAKE THE DEATH PENALTY MANDATORY. 
Under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-202 
and 76-1-501 (Supp. 1973), the State must prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the crime of murder v.-as committed 
under any one of eight statutorily-defined circumstances. 
Only afteritis found by a unanimous jury that the State 
has proved every element of the substantive offense of 
first dPqree murder, may thedeath penalty be considered. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-206 (1) (Supp. 1973). The sentencing 
phase of the bifurcated proceeding is then the opportunity 
for both prosecution and defense to present evidence of 
aggravating or mitigating circumstances which may have attended 
the commission of the crime, or which focus on the character 
of the defendant. Aggravating circumstances may include 
t~ose outlined in Section 76-5-202. Mitigating circumstances 
m3y include duress, youth, intoxication, etc., or "any 
other fact in mitigation of the penalty." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-3-207 (1). (Supp. 1973). If the jury is unable to 
unanimously find for the death penalty at the conclusion 
of th0 penalty phase, the court is required to impose a 
0 ;entenc-~ of life imprisonment. Utah Code Ann. 5 76-3-207(2) 
-29-
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This Court held in State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 
at 1347-1348 (Utah 1977), that the burden is on the state in 
the penalty phase to show that the totality of evidence of 
aggravating circumstances outweighs the totality of 
mitigating circumstances. This Court further found that in 
this case the trial court properly instructed the jury as 
to this requirement. Pierre, ~· at 1348. 
Appellant attacks bot~ the standard of proof and 
the sentencing procedure on three grounds: first, because 
the State has already proved beyond a reasonable doubt the 
existence of ~~r0er under one of the statutory circumstances 
which may also be considered as aggravation, the burden 
of pro~ing ~iliyation falls upon defendant; second, the 
,;outweigh" standard of proof is too low to prevent 
mistakes or give adequate guidance to the sentencing 
discretion of the judge or jury; and third, the low 
standard m~kes the death penalty mandatory where no 
mitigation is presented. 
First it should be noted that the standard of 
nroo:= ::~o\·er::i::; t:-:~ ~,e;-:a.l ty r~ase o: 2 capital prosecution 
was an issue raised on appellant's first appeal to this 
Court. (See Point XII, Appellant's Amended Brief, State 
v. Pierre). Appellant contendcJ there that the State 
should be rcq~ired to prove Lrvr~J a r0asonahle doubt 
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correctly found that such a burden may well be impossible 
to carry in some instances and that no authority existed 
for imposing such an unreasonable requirement. Pierre, 
sup~a, at 1347. Appellant has merely rephrased his original 
argument with a new emphasis on an alleged statinq of the 
burden of proof at sentencing. This issue certainly could 
have been raised on appeal and is therefore barred by the 
waiver doctrine, Point I. supra. Second, all three of the 
attacks upon Utah's sentencing procedure enumerated above 
could have been raised in a petition for rehearing to this 
Court but were not. Also, they were urged upon the 
United States Supreme Court as grounds for granting 
certiorari. The Supreme Court denied certiorari and while 
this was admittedly not a ruling upon the merits, it 
can be considered a ruling that no significant or 
unresolved legal issues were presented. Wade v. Mayo, 
334 u.s. 672 (1948:. The prese~t raisingof these issues 
therefore represents nothing more than a re-litigation 
of arguments already found by this Court and the Supreme 
Court to be either lacking in significance or substance. 
Indeed, since these issues have tv1ice been briefed ty 
t~e State, once on t~e appeal to this Court and once in 
opposition to certiorari, and since Judge Sawaya hild 
both briefs and both court rulin0s submitted to him as 
part of respondent's motion to dismiss, it was totally 
proper for him to reject appellant's claims as a matter 
0f 1:~1: on the •_hc·o·-·; tl:at the·]· J,,,c! been previousl~r resolved 
,-1n l ~:1c>.cri 1"''J3l r;H·r ~~ nr suff ic Lc,nt su!JstZlnCe (F~ 150) .. 
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With respect to appellant's first contention, the 
burden of proof is not shifted to the defendant under the 
Utah procedure but remains at all times upon the State. 
Pierre, supra, at 1347. The appellant here is confusing 
the state's burden of proof with his burden of going 
forward. Burden of proof denotes the duty of establishing 
the truth of a given proposition by such a quantum of 
evidence as the la.,.: demands in the case in \oJl1ich the 
issue arises, \.,hether civil or criminal, Hill v. Smith, 
260 u.s. 592 (1923), while the burden of going forward is 
a term used to designat~ the duty of proceeding with 
evidence at a particular stage in a court proceeding, 
e.g., McElroy v. Force, 75 Ill.App.2d 441, 220 N.E.2d 
761 (1966). See also IX \Vigmore, Evidence § 2487 (3d 
ed. 1940). In the instant case, a legal duty was not 
imposed upon appellant to produce evidence of mitigating 
circumstances, but rather a practical necessity of going 
fon:ard was imposed by self-interest. \·ihen the State has 
provrd beyo~d a reasonable doubt the existence of at 
the guilt phase o~ a c~pital murder trial, a practical 
necessity of goi~g for~ard wit~ at least some mitigating 
evidence n'av \'el·y \\'211 be pli-!C"'•:l U"JOn t:1e clefcndi'lnt 
-32-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
during the sentencing proceeding by the defendant's own 
self interest to save his life, but such is not a legal 
burden placed upon him by statute and the burden of 
persuasion remains always with the State. 
Additionally, while the State has previously 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of a 
statutory aggravating circumstance as a prerequisite to a 
finding of guilt and as a condition precedent to reaching 
the sentencing phase of the bifurcated proceeding, the 
aggravating circumstance during the sentencing phase is 
simply one factor among many to be weighed when determining 
whether or not this is an appropriate case for the 
impos)tion of the death penalty. While this factor may 
weigh heavily in the minds of the jury or judge, it is 
statutorily given no more weight than other factors in 
aggravation or mitigation. The defendant may introduce 
into evidence anything of probative force, and in addition 
to the six statutory mitigating factors, "any other fact 
in mitigation of the penalty." Section 76-3-207(1) (g). 
~loreo\·e~, i~ t~e defe~dant chooses to have t~e sentencing 
proceeding before a jury, as was done in the instant case, 
the State need only fail to convince one juror that the 
aggravating circu~stances do not outweigh the mitigating, 
-33-
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and life imprisonment, rather than the death penalty, is 
impnsen, since the jury's decision on penalty must be 
unanimous. Section 76-3-207 (2) (Supp. 1973). 
One can see that the appellant here is 
arguing circularly. He would certainly have cause to 
complain if the State did not have to prove all elements 
of first degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Yet 
once the State has proved a:' necessary elements, appellant 
at.tcr•rts to comr>l:lin that by meeting its burden the State 
has improperly Made rr.itigation harder to sho•.·:. The real 
st.J.tute is st: 1n~cnt un tht StdtE~~ It requires proof beyond 
reasonable douht of aggravat1ng circumstances in the guilt 
ph~se. Aggravation must be proved in order to obtain a 
simple conviction, not just in order to obtain the death 
penalty. This Court has recognized that the Utah statutes more 
fully satisfy the requirements of minimizing "the risk of 
1-'~0lly arbitrary an·J capricious action," Gregg v. Georgia, 
428 U.S. lSJ, 189 (1'1 76), than other state standards. This 
o: -.::roo.= beyo:1C:: a .!:.·ea.SO!l.clble 
doubt obtains in the lJUilt Fhase in Utah to find the crime 
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But even if appellant were to have what he is 
urging, there would be no difference. Presently the State 
must prove aggravation in the guilt phase and consequently 
it has a harder time securing the initial conviction, but 
perhaps an easier time proving aggravation in the 
sentencing phase. Appellant urges that the State should 
bear the burden of proving aggravating circumstances in 
the sentencing phase, yet this simply means that there 
would be less that the State would need to prove in order to 
secure the initial conviction, which indeed would violate 
the concerns of Mullaney v. Wilber, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), 
cited in appellant's brief. In either case, the State 
would have to prove aggravating circumstances "overwhelmingly" 
and appellant presented only the "most minimal" mitiaa~ing 
considerations. Pierre, supra, at 1348. Therefore, 
whether the State in this case should bear its reasonable 
doubt burden more heavily in the sentencing phase or the 
guilt phase is of no material significance. 
!!oreove~, it is not true t~at the State, by 
securing a conviction, has effectively guaranLe~d the 
death penalty unless the defendant comes forward with strong 
mitigation. As stated, the jury must be unanimously 
convinced that agsravation outweighs mitigation, section 
76-3-207 (2), and the State bears the burden of convincing 
-JS-
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them. If neither party presented additional evidence at 
the penalty phase, it is pure speculation to suggest that 
the jury would always impose death. In any case, here 
appellant did present mitigating evidence and the State 
~ present additional aggravating considerations. That 
evidence included arguments as to the deterrent effect of 
the death penalty, the intelligence level of the appellant, 
and his past criminal activities. (Tr. 4197-4234, 4247-
4270, 4136-4137). The jurv was properly instructed and 
they unanimously found for the capital penalty. 
Petitioner's reliance on In re Winship, 397 U.S. 
358 (1970), and Mullaney v. \·Jilber, supra, is misplaced. 
This Court in In re Winship, supra, held that the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt in the adjudicatory stage of a 
proceeding when a juvenile is charged with an act that 
would constitute a crime if committed by an adult. In 
footnote l, the Court expressly stated that the opinion was 
In rc ::.3u:t. 387 U.S. at 13). 397 C.S. at 359. r1ullanev v. 
\Hlbcr, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), held that t:.c lluc Process 
Clau5e of the Fourteenth Amcndnent re~~ires the wrosecution 
to prove beyond a reCJso:1aLlc> c:oulJt c":,~r·: [,-,ct ncce.~:J;n·y to 
-lil-
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constitute the crime charged. This is exactly what utah 
Code Ann. § 76-1-501(1) (Supp. 1973), requires. It is 
important to note the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice 
Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger in Jl.1ullaney: 
Having once met that rigorous 
(beyond a reasonable doubt) burden 
of proof that, for example, in a 
case such as this, the defendant not 
only killed a fellow human being, but 
did it with malice aforethought, the 
State could quite consistently with 
such a constitutional principle 
conclude that a defendant who sought 
to establish the defense of insanity, 
and thereby escape any punishment 
whatever for a heinous crime, should 
bear the laboring oar on such an 
issue. 
421 u.s. at 706. 
The Utah Supreme Court correctly ruled that: 
"~lullanev is not applicable in this matter as the Maine 
statute shifted the proof . . . to the defendant in a trial 
where guilt or innocence was determined. ~ullaney does 
not reac~ or control ~atters in the penalty chase." 
State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d at 1347 (Utah 1977). 
37-
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No burden of proof is shifted under the Utah 
capital-sentencing procedure. Here the State simply 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the 
substantive offense, thus meeting the concerns of 
Winship and Mullaney. What appellant in fact argues is 
that the State carried its bur6en too well and made it 
more difficult for him to effectively show rniti<Jation. 
This hardly aMounts to a constitutional defect. There 
is no question that if Mitigation is desired, the 
defendant 1:1ust show it. The State has no obligation 
to prove the absence of mitigation. State v. Pierre, 
supr~, at 1347 (citing Gregg, Proffitt, and Jurek). 
Appellant's second argument, that the "outv;eigh" 
standard of proof in the sentencing phase is too low and 
so allows for error and unguided discretion is likewise 
unfounded andwas argued previously on appeal. The United 
States Supreme Court has already upheld a procedure 
wherein the standard was that the totality of aggravating 
c~~c~~s~~nccs out~cigh the totality of ~itigating 
circumstances. Th~ Florida death penalty statute required 
that therP he " . insufficient Mitigating circumstances, 
as enurr,,~crutPd in sttbsection (7), to out\·.·eigh the aggravatin:: 
circuc-.stc1nc~s." Fl<1. Stat. Ann., § 921.141 (Supn. 1976-1977' 
(emphasis added) 
-3 (~-
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In approving this standard the Court stated: 
The directions given to the judge and 
jury by the Florida statute are sufficiently 
clear and precise to enable the various 
aggravating circumstances to be weighed 
against the mitigating ones. As a result, 
the trial court's sentencing discretion 
is guided and channeled by a system that 
focuses on the circumstances of each 
individual homicide and individual 
defendant in deciding whether the death 
penalty is to be imposed. 
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 u.s. 242, 258 (1976) (emphasis added). 
This Court in the Pierre case referred to the Florida statute 
and the Proffitt holding as authority for its ruling that 
in the penalty phase the State must prove aggravating factors 
that outweigh the mitigating, Pierre, supra, at 1347, 1348, 
in order that the jury can More fully balance the equities 
and be guided by the facts. 
A similar "balancing"approach was adopted by the 
drafters of the Model Penal Code, ALI, Model Penal Code S 
201.6, Comment 3, p. 71 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959), and 
cited with approval by the United States Supreme Court in 
Gregg ,. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 193-195 (1976): 
While soMe have suggested that standards 
to guide a capital jury's sentencing delibera-
tions are impossible to formulate, the fact is 
that such standards have been developed. lfuen 
the drafters of the Model Penal Code faced 
this problem, they concluded 'that it is wi~hin 
the realm of possibility to point to the maLn 
circumstances of aggravation and of mitigation 
that should be weiCJhccl and weiCJhed against each 
other wh0n they are presented in a concrete 
-39-
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case.' [Citations omitted, emphasis in 
original.] While such standards are by 
necessity somewhat general, they do provide 
uidance to the sentencin authority and 
t ereby reduce the l~kelihood that it will 
ir.tpose a sentence that fairly can be called 
capricious or arbitrary. (emohasis added) . 
Therefore, the State's burden of proving aggravation in 
excess of mitigation constitutionally insures an absence 
of arbitrariness and capriciousness. 
Appellant's third argunent, that in Utah the 
death sentence can be mandatorily imposed, is without merit 
and was, again, u:--<:erl uron the United States Supreme Court 
as grounds for granling certiorari. As stated earlier, 
appe:Llant has no <Jro'Jnds for a complaint that if a defendant 
remains silent in the sentencing phase of his trial, a death 
sentence will be mandated by his earlier conviction. Appel-
lant did attemrt to argue mitigating circumstances. His real 
problem is simply that the factors which he offered in 
mitigation of his brutal crime were "most minimal--even 
froM the point of vie1v of inference." Pierre, supra at 1348. 
v~- c··~n ~s a~ abst~act co~sijeration, a co~viction 
in Utah for first degree Murder never mandates death. A 
jury is sL1tutor i l\' ernpoh·ered to iM;,ose a. li fc sentence 
whenever one iuror decides against death after aggravating 
and mitiyatinCJ L1ctnrs at·e l:cic:jhc:1. Utah Code Ann. ~ 
76-3-207 (2) (S~::o:'. lLJ"i\). 
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Note that appellant's attempt to compare the 
Utah capital punishment procedures to those found 
unconstitutional in the Louisiana cases is without 
foundation. In Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 u.s. 325 (1976), 
the Court held invalid a state scheme in which the jury 
was required to determine only whether there was a specific 
intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm under one of 
five statutory circumstances. If the conjunction of intent 
and specific statutory act was found, the offense was first 
degree murder and the mandatory punishment was death. Any 
qualification or recommendation which a jury might add to 
its verdict was without any effect. Such a statutory scheme 
is clearly inapposite to that in Utah. 
Finally, appellant's contention that "Utah is the 
only state where the standard of proof in the capital 
sentencing phase is so low" is simply untrue, as witnessed 
by the standard of proof employed by Florida during the 
capital sentencing phase of their proceedings and discussed 
above. Ap?ellant's further statement that Utah is the 
only jurisdiction where the substantive elements of the 
capital offense are the sa~e as the aggravating 
circumstances needed to be proved to sentence the offender 
to death is also incorrect. The United States Supreme 
-41-
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Court stated in Jurek v. Texas, 428 u.s. 262 (1976): 
While Texas has not adopted a list of 
statutory aggravating circumstances the 
existence of which can justify the imposition 
of the death penalty as have Georgia and Florida, 
its action in narrowing the categories of murders 
for which a death sentence May be imposed serves 
much the same purpose. 
Id. at 270. 
The so-called "low standard" in Utah only exists because 
such a high standard is required for a conviction as in 
Texas. Utah is no different than the "vast majority of 
jurisdictions" cited in footnote 5 of appellant's brief at 
22, in that it also requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
of any aggravatinq circumstance. That proof is simply 
required at an earlier stage of the proceeding. 
Since the jury "must have information prejudicial 
to the question of guilt but relevant to the question of 
penalty in order to impose a rational sentence," Gregg, 
428 u.s. at 190, 191, it follows that if the defendant has 
little or no evidence to present in mitigation during the 
sent~ncing ?hasE a~ the bifurcated proceeding, it is probable 
tha:. the c~c:a.t:-t pc::na.lty ·..;ill be irL!Josed. T~is is ~ore likely 
where tl1c ~urd~rs are of an extraordinarily grucso~e and 
tortuous nature since mitigation in such cases ~ust he more 
compcllin<J in order to outweigh the aggravating circu~stance 
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of brutality. But in no sense is the death sentence 
mandatorily imposed. "Mandatory" connotes a statutory 
usurpation of the jury's right to weigh individual 
equities and to choose the sentence which it feels the 
case v1arrants. (Stanislaus) Roberts v. Louisiana, supra. 
Appellant has failed to raise any unresolved or 
material issue in Point II of his brief. The Utah death 
penalty statutes did not shift any burden to appellant. 
Further, appellant was given the benefit of a sentencing 
proceeding in which all relevant mitigating factors he 
wished to present were weighed against the aggravating 
factors which the State had to produce. Finally, first 
degree murder in Utah is nevFr punished by a mandatory 
death sentence. 
These issues were previously raised to this Court 
on appellant's direct appeal althou<]h couched in soMewhat 
different terms. Certainly, the is~.,,cs could have been 
raised on that appeal even in the same manner presented 
here. Indeed, the identical issues were briefed to the 
United States Supreme Court I·Jilich cl :nicd certiorari. 
Thus, Judge Sawaya properly dismissed these arguments as 
a mcttter of law on two theorj ''": (1) Utah's waiver 
doctrine precluded further rcvic~ of the jssues because 
the~· 1:crc or certainly coulrl h:•ve b, ''n raised on 
-4 3 
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appellant's direct appeal; and (2) based on prior adjudica-
tion of these issues by the Utah Supreme Court and the 
United States Supreme Court (Gregg, Jurek, Proffitt, etc.), 
the district court properly concluded that the issues 
lacked sufficient legal merit to warrant further post-
conviction review. 
POIHT III. 
THE CONCEDED QUALITATIVE DIFFERENCE BET\1EEN A 
SENTENCE OF DEATH AND A SENTENCE OF LIFE IHPRISON-
MENT DOES NOT REQUIRE A COURT TO ENGAGE IN 
REPEA'l'ED REVIEW OF RESOLVED OR Il"lMATERIAL LEGAL 
AND FACTUAL ISSUES. 
Respondr·nt concedes that there is a qualitative 
diff~rence betwPen death and life. The authority which 
appellant citPs for this proposition, however, must be 
viewed in its proper context. Woodson v. North Carolina, 
428 U.S. 280 (1976); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 
(1977), and Lockett v. Ohio, 572 L.EcL2d 973 (1978), all 
involved the United States Suprene Court's own review of 
the merits of the cases. The language which is cited 
sta;L~S fo!: t>.-:2 ?:-o~c.:;ition that :::te cou~t.s, t·:heil they do 
review capital cases (which the United States Supreme Court 
refused to do in appellant's case) nusl he careful in their 
re\·ic· •. ,ing in order to insure that any decision to impose 
death is "based on reason rathPl- than caprice or cnotion." 
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place. This Court has reviewed appellant's conviction 
and sentence and has affirmed it. The Supreme Court in 
turn has declined to spend its time in further review 
of appellant's alleged "substantial" issues. Respondent 
therefore submits that at this stage of the proceedings, 
it is the quality of appellant's legal claims more than 
the nature of the possible penalty which determines 
whether this Court would be acting either unconscionably 
or in violation of due process when it may affirm the 
granting of the dismissal motion to appellant's habeas 
corpus petition. 
First, Points I, II, and IV herein show that 
no new legal issues have been presented as a basis for 
relief or that if there are such issues, failure to raise 
them on direct appeal constitutes a waiver. 
Second, the State has a very leqitimate 
interest in insuring that the already lengthy time of liti-
gation is not unduly extended. Appellant has argued that 
a defe~dant nor~ally will not hold back or "save" issues 
in order to rilise them by means of a writ of habeas corpus 
because to do so Hould preclude a defendant from immediate 
relief. Note, however, that there is no absolute difference 
bet1,een relief available on appeal and that available through 
-45-
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habeas corpus. Just as outright release is possible 
through direct appeal, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405 (Supp. 
1973), so is subsequent prosecution possible after a 
defendant has successfully sought habeas corpus, Utah 
Code Ann. S 76-1-405(2) (Supp. 1973). There is therefore 
a real possibility that a defendant may unreasonably 
extend the litigation time by not asserting all known 
grounds for relief on direct appeal. Utah's approach 
not only conserves judicial resources but also helps 
prevent prejudice to the State's case which may result 
from having to re-try the defendant years later when 
witnesses might not he available and me~ories are no 
longer fresh. 
Thirn, appellant maintains that since all of 
his claims allege deprivations of constitutional rights 
he cannot be prevented from asserting them in his habeas 
corpus petition except by the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel. Appellant confuses the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel with the doctrine of waiver. See respondent's 
Foint I. in No. 16168, and Point I\' of this brief, infc-u.. 
Respon1ent again maintains that if the issues could have be~ 
raised on direct appeal, they are waived as to any 
collu.teral relief. Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 400 P.2d 
968 (l'l68); Bryant v. Tu~!2~..!:· 19 Uto.h 2J 284, 431 P.2d 121 
(1967). ~1oceovcr, Pule G~ll(Ll (l), L:t.e1h '"-:ulcc; of Civil 
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Procedure, further requires that a habeas corpus petitioner 
raise issues which assert a "substantial" denial of con-
stitutional rights. Thus, if the court considering the post-
conviction claims determines that as a matter of law no 
claims of "substantial" deprivation are alleged, he may dismiss 
the petition under Rule 12(b) (6) for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted. 
Finally, the severity of the penalty does not make 
it automatically unconscionable for this Court to deny 
further review of the habeas corpus petition. Appellant, 
by stressing the difference between life and death, seems 
to be urging the position that habeas corpus review is 
automaticaly required in all capital punishment cases. 
Again, the legal claims asserted, not the penalty at stake, 
must control. This was clearly the criteria utilized by 
the United States Supreme Court in denying appellant's petition 
for writ of certiorari, and when it most recently denied a 
Florida death row inmate's final application for certiorari 
without opinion In Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582 
(5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied U.S. (March 26, 
1979) . 
Note that a state need not make post-conviction 
relief available at all if it so chooses. In Case v. 
ricbraska, 381 u.s. 336 (1965), the Supreme Court recenlly 
sLJtc-cl: 
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It does not follow, however, that this 
Court has the power to compel a state to 
employ a collateral post-conviction remedy 
in which specific federal claims may be 
raised. 
~a~~ Florida, No. 77-6025, cert. denied, 435 u.s. 
1014, 1017 (1978). 
Second, since the State enjoys this "wide 
discretion" in "devis[ing] their own systems of 
review in criminal cases," Carter v. Illinois, 329 u.s. 
173, 175 (1946), it follows thdt a state may limit a 
post-conviction remedy as it deems appropriate. Indeed, 
this Court has limited the habeas corpus petition to 
issues of jurisdiction, and obvious illegality of sentence. 
Rammell v. Smith, 560 P.2d 1108 (1977). 
Therefore, since post-conviction relief is 
disc=etionary with the State and since once a state does 
adopt some method of review as in Rule 65B(i), it may limit 
the scope and applicability of that method, it follows that 
appellant is not entitled to a hearing on his petition 
simply by virtue of the fact that the penalty which may 
confront him is severe. There is no per se habe0s corpus 
review in capital cases. The very fact that the United 
States s~~~e~e Court denies nurerous certior~ri petitions 
in capital cases attests to the fact that the qualitative 
difference between a prison term and death alone is 
insufficient to overcome defects in o~ absence of viable 
leC]C!l iSSUC'S. 
Tlwrefore, bccnuse ilpprl L1nt !us rnjoycd lhE• full 
t!Ji.; St:ltL::. r~.J.~.· ac!;~._ir_l:-;tc;~ i~.1 cxtr.loi-llL 1~1~\· 1-(•]lcf S";'SLPJTl 
-41-1-
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as it chooses, within the bounds of due process, 
appellant may be precluded from a hearing on his 
petition by his failure to raise issues on timely 
appeal and his failure here to raise any unresolved, 
substantial or material issues. Appellant's possible 
penalty does not require this Court or any post-
conviction court to order repeated review of his 
conviction and sentence. 
-49-
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POINT IV. 
UTAH'S POST-CONVICTION HABEAS CORPUS 
WAIVER DOCTRINE WAS A PROPER BASIS 
FOR THE LOWER COURT'S DISHISSAL OF 
ALL ISSUES AS A MATTER OF LAW ON THE 
FACE OF THE PLEADINGS. 
Appellant raises four claims on this Point 
which essentially revolve around the assertion that 
res iudicata was improperly applied in his case to 
preclude him from raising t~e issues contained in his 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The appellant's 
claims on appeal are: (1) Utah procedure sustained by 
this Court i ', r< st-conviction habeas corpus cases has 
virtually suspended the writ in violation of Article I, 
Section 5 of the Utah Constitution; (2) Appellant was 
prevented from raising "substantial state and federal 
constitutional questions"; (3) collateral estoppel 
and not res judicata should be applied by courts in 
post-conviction habeas corpus cases; and (4) the Third 
District Court was required to have the complete record 
of issues raisc<i )y) appellant. 
Appellant's funda~ental premise concerning r~s 
iudicata suffers rrom a basic misunderstanding of the 
-::!(1-
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waiver doctrine detailed at length by respondent, supra, 
in Point I., and in No. 16168 at p. 9-25. A review 
of the numerous Utah cases involving post-conviction writs 
of habeas corpus reveals that the Utap Supreme Court has 
repeatedly invoked what is essentially a waiver doctrine 
in regard to recognizable claims. A petitioner may not 
raise claims in a post-conviction petition for writ of 
habeas corpus that could or should have been raised on 
direct appeal. Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 440 P. 
2'. 968 (1968). This standard is imposed whether an appeal 
is or is not taken. Bryant v. Turner, 19 Utah 2d 284, 431 
P.2d 121 (1967) (no appeal taken); Maguire v. Smith, 547 
P.2d G97 (Utah 1976) (appeal taken). The tyPes of claims 
that are permissible on a post-conviction writ are stated 
in Rammell v. Smith, 560 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1977): 
[T)he writ has its purposes, including 
the providing of a remedy where it 
challenges the jurisdiction of the court 
rendering the judgment, or where the 
sentence imposed is one not authorized 
by law, or where it is of an entirely 
different character than that which the 
statute prescribes, so that a person 
is being held under an obviously illegal 
sentence and it would thus be unconscionable 
not to examine the issue. 
560 P.2d at 1109. 
ln this 
An analysis of the habeas corpus waiver doctrine 
h~s been muddled by appellant's interjection case 
-51-
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of elements of collateral estoppel and res judicata. It 
is necessary to clear up any confusion by examining the 
exact nature of the concepts of waiver, collateral 
estoppel and res judicata. 
Initially, it must be understood that res 
judicata has generally been held to be inapplicable in 
the area of habeas corpus. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 
(1963). The writ lies to test proceedings so fundamentally 
lawless that imprisonment pursuant to them is void, not 
merely erroneous, so the application of res judicata 
would contravene the very nature of the writ. 
Collateral estoppel and waiver are distinguished 
in Bl_ack's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed. Rev. at 650: "Waiver is 
voluntary surrender or relinquishment of some known right, 
benefit or advantage; estoppel is the inhibition to assert 
it." A party is generally precluded from relitigating an 
issue that has been decided adversely to him in a prior 
proceeding. In retrospectively examining the rights of a 
habeas coqJL;s j:>etitioner, this Court has not found the 
~riso::er esto==ed ~ro~ raising issues that could have been 
raised on appeal but were not. In that case, there has been 
no adverse decision on the issue. Father, the position of 
this Court has been that a petitioner is found to hc:tve ~ 
claims tho.t could )-LJYe been ro.iscd or• o.pn,·al but \,.,,t-c' not. 
l\S st 0 t~._'c1 .J.Oo\··,-"', ~: .'_:~·-" 1 t·:r·~\..>!Ll' in\:nl\·l-::s 011 ("'1('J'1"'nt of 
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intent or knowledge of the giving up of the right. This 
Court has deemed claims that could have been raised on 
direct appeal as being within the knowledge of petitioner, 
supporting the finding of waiver. When the state has 
created the right of direct appeal of a criminal conviction, 
it is not unreasonable to enforce a waiver doctrine with 
respect to another state-created right, habeas corpus. 
Thus, respondent contends that Utah courts are utilizing 
a waiver theory, not collateral estoppel, and, furthermore, 
a review of the merits of appellant's claims indicates 
that the doctrine was correctly applied in this case. 
Appellant's first argument concerning an alleged 
uncon~~itutional suspension of the writ runs contrary to 
the commonly-accepted meaning of the Suspension Clause. The 
state constitution, Art. I, Sec. 5, is an almost 
verbatim adoption of the federal suspension clause, Art. I., 
Sec. 9, Cl. 2. The suspension clause is directed at 
suspects, not at convicts. See Collings, Habeas Corpus for 
Convicts--Constitutional Rights or Legislative Grace?, 40 
Calif. L. Rev. 335, 340-41 (1952). lmy modification of the 
post-conviction writ of habeas corpus docs not run afoul 
of the suspension clause. Thus, any limitations imposed by 
this Court upon the post-conviction use of the writ cannot 
deprive petitioner of a state constitutional right. 
Moreover, the writ has not been suspended, rather it has 
-53-
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been limited in a permissible fashion by the state as 
discussed in No. 16168, p. 9-25. 
The assertion that "substantial state and 
federal constitutional rights "are raised in a habeas corpus 
petition (appellant's second claim) does not, by itself 
meetapetitioner's burden of forming a specific, substantiated 
pleading as required by Rule 65B(i) (2), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure which requires a post-conviction habeas 
corpus complaint to: 
Set forth in plain and concise 
terms the factual data constituting 
each and every manner in which the 
compl~1rant claims that any con-
stitutional rights were violated. 
The complainant shall have attached 
thereto affidavits, copies of records, 
or other evidence supporting such 
allegations, or shall state why the 
same are not attached. 
Thus, the petitioner in habeas corpus has the burden to 
demonstrate to at least a threshold degree in his complaint, 
that the facts upon which he bases his claim may provide 
adequate grounds as a matter of law. If his statement 
or clai~s a~2 sup~ortinc data are too vague a~d 
speculative to enable a court to determine if the waiver 
doctrine is satisfied, the petitioner has not made out a 
claim upon which relief may be granted. Or, if the 
facts are facts which were known in time to have been 
used to attack the co~victi~~ dirc~tlv on a~ocal they also 
-5.\-
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corpus, regardless of whether such an attack would have 
been successful on the grounds claimed. 
Judge Henry J. Friendly in his article, !! 
Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal 
Judgments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 155-56 (1970), has 
concluded that habeas corpus should not be available upon 
a mere open assertion that a "constitutional" right has 
been denied. Utah, by means of Rule 658 (i) (2), _has 
approved of this philosophy; because appellant's claims 
of denial of state and federal constitutional rights 
were open and unsubstantiated, they were properly dismissed 
as a matter of law. 
The third claim of error on this Point, the res 
judicata - collateral estoppel argument, has been 
adequately disposed of in the initial paragraphs of this 
Point, supra, and in the additional sources cited therewith. 
Appellant states that the court has used a procedure to 
exclude issues in habeas corpus petitions "[W]ithout 
actually calling it res judicata." Brief of appellant at 31. 
Respondent has demonstrated that the reason "it" has never 
been called res judicata is because, in reality, a waiver 
doctrine is being employed. 
Appellant's final contention on this point, the 
alleged necessity of a complete record on which to base a 
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motion to dismiss, is very similar to the claim of error 
raised and rebutted by respondent in No. 16168 at p. 32-48. 
The essence of respondent's position on this point is 
that nothing outside the pleadings was required for 
Judge Saw~yd to dismiss all issues as a matter of law 
because (1) habeas corpus is a unique proceeding to which 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure arc generally applicable 
but are superseded by Rule 6'JB; (2\ a failure to comply 
with the requirements of Hule 6SB (i) (2) made appellant's 
petition faci:llly defective; (3) naked factual assertions 
do not ch:~nnl· t :·". nature of an underlying legal claim; and 
(4) Utah has ~ccorded the district court statutory authority 
to fashion t·•tles or modes of proceeding that may be 
utilized to conform to the spirit of the law. 1 See Points I 
and II of respondent's brief in No. 16168. 
Respondent, in Point I, supra, demonstrates 
that appellant's allcCJcdly "factual" claims are in reality 
legal issues that were dismissed by Judge Sawaya on the 
() f :.. ~-. \ 
~lJ'_t·:~· ,\dcliri.,•ncllly, appellant's rc•liance on Parrish v. 
'•!j2 P.2d 1086 (Utah 1975), anc1 the 
Utc1!1 Rulcs of l't\'L l Pn1ccdurc is und .. rcut by the' analysis 
l 
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of respondent in No. 16168 at p. 40. 
Appellant states at p. 34 of his Brief, 
"In remanding the case to the district court this court 
must order the district court to allow the appellant to 
raise issues that could have been raised on direct appeal 
of his conviction." (Emphasis added). This concession 
that the issues could have been raised on direct appeal puts 
Utah's waiver doctrine squarely at issue. Respondent's 
discussion has shown the waiver doctrine to be constitutionally 
sound in basis, applied with due process, and a legitimate 
state method of administering criminal justice with fairness 
and efficiency. The doctrine should be upheld in this 
case. 
-S7-
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POINT V. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ACTED PROPERLY IN 
DISMISSING RESPONDENT'S HOTION TO 
DISMISS SINCE, UNDER THE WAIVER 
DOCTRINE, APPELLANT WAS RAISING 
ISSUES IVHICH HAD ALREADY BEEN 
ADJUDGED. 
As noted in appellant's brief, the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure apply to habeas corpus actions, according 
to Burleigh v. Turner, lS Utah 2d ll8, 388 P.2d 412, 414 
(1964). Yet, inasmuch as those same rules provide unique 
requirements for habeas corpus actions, respondent contends 
that the rulings of l~w in this matter must also be in 
accordance with the est.ahlished procedural requirements of 
habeas corpus. Specifically, respondent submits that Rule 
65B(i) (2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, must additionally 
be complied with by appellant in order to effectuate proper 
habeas corpus relief. 
The rule requires that a petitioner for habeas 
corpus must "state that the legality or constitutionality of 
his co:n".1itr:1cnt or co01rirw~\c·nt has not already been adjudged 
founJ to bC' !Jcinclin,, :t:1 action alccady a:ljuJc_Jccl, Lllc rule 
:I. 
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As has been above discussed in Point I, respondent 
submits that appellant is attempting to raise issues 
heretofore decided and thus Judge Sawaya, as a matter of 
law, was justified in dismissing his petition, as per 
Rule 65B(i) (2). Yet appellant contends that before a court 
may dismiss a complaint, the court must be convinced "to 
a certainty that plaintiff would be entitled to no relief 
under any state of facts. Liquor Control Commission 
v. Athas, 121 Utah 457, 243 P.2d 441, 443 (1952). This 
would be a very strict burden of proof on a respondent. 
Respondent, however, contends that such a degree of 
certainty has not been required in all cases. For example, 
in King Bros., Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln Company, 13 Utah 2d 
339, 374 P.2d 254 (1962), this Court ruled that motions to 
dismiss shall be sustained "only if the party [being 
dismissed) could not in any event establish a right to 
recover." Id. at 256. This general principle is also 
cited in Baur v. Pacific Finance Corporation, 14 Utah 2d 
283, 383 P.2d 397 (1963). There, this Court determined that 
motions to dismiss are harsh measures: 
which courts should grant only 
when it clearly appears that taking 
the view most favorable to the 
complaint and any facts which 
might properly be proved thereunder, 
no right to redress could be established; 
and unless it so clearly appears, 
doubt should be resolved in favor of 
allowing him the opportunity ~o present 
his proof. 
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383 P. 2d at 397 · (emphasis added). 
In accord, Barrus v. Wilkinson, 16 Utah 2d 204, 398 P.2d 
207 (1965). 
Thus, respondent submits that Judge Sawaya was 
properly able to grant the motion to dismiss since appellant 
could not meet the higher burden of Rule 65B(i) nor the 
general requirements of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
and the non-habeas corpus cases, King Bros., Inc., supra, 
and Baur, supra_. .ll.lso, inasmuch as ap!Jellant had previously 
raised issues in his direct appeal and since other issues 
raised before Jud~c Sawaya could have been raised, it was 
impossible for ap;Jellant to establish a further right to 
relief and the lo~er court properly dismissed the complaint 
as a matter of law. 
If this Court were to affirm Judge Sawaya's action 
it would not be a novel result. Several decisions by this 
Court have upheld similar rulings by Utah's lower courts. 
The waiver doctrine is cited with approval as a proper bar 
to u retitioner's reyuest for habeas corpus relief. 
therefore, been u:)ilcld. Bruce v. East, 43 Utah 327, 134 
Pac. 1175 (1913); :~_L'brwcncn v. Turner, 27 Utcth 2cl 428, 497 
P.2d 34 (1972); .\lr:.c~lj__c~~ Smith, 531 P.2d 864 (Utah 1975); 
_Reclcl:i_sl~~-· _ __:S:niti~, c,~,J l'.2d S','J (Utah l'l78). 
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As to the propriety of Judge Sawaya's ruling, it 
should be noted that the State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338 
(Utah 1977), case and briefs submitted thereon were 
attached to respondent's motion and therefore Judge 
Sawaya was able to make a judicious decision as to the 
waiver doctrine. That is, he could make objective decisions 
as to the issues which were in fact raised on the direct 
appeal, and he could make subjective determinations as to 
issues which could have been raised. Thus, he was able to 
rule as a matter of law that the waiver doctrine barred 
appellant from further arguing these foreclosed issues. 
See also, No. 16168, p. 9-49 Points I, II, and IV, 
supra. 
Even if Judge Sawaya had desired to reach the 
merits of appellant's claim of prosecutorial discretion, 
the United States Supreme Court has expressly taken this 
area out of consideration. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 
u.s. 238 (1972); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); 
Proffitt v. Florida, ~28 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas 
428 u.s. 262 (1976); <.-:oodson •:. :-Jorth Carolina, 428 U.S. 
280 (1976); and Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976). 
See also: Point I, supra, p. 16 No. 16168, p. 86-92 
This position is further strengthened by the fact that 
this Court has ruled on the merits of many of appellant's 
claims (State _\_.:_~'rre, su::Jra:, and the United Stutes 
Cuurt has denied certiot-Llri--thereby acknmvledging 
-61-
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that these issues were not new and did not require further 
consideration. 
Thus, respondent submits that, under the burden of 
proving motions to dismiss petitions of habeas corpus, the 
requirements of Rule 65B(i) (2) are dissimilar from 
traditional civil actions. While most civil actions cannot 
be dismissed absent the strict standards of Athas, or the 
standards of King Bros. and Baur, habeas corpus proceedings 
only require the moving party to show that the issues being 
raised have already been adjudged--or could have been 
adjudged--and such showing requires the court to dismiss 
the petition. Therefore, respondent urges this Court to 
affirm Judge .,ci\·Uya's rulirq, since, as a matter of law, 
the grantin1 of respondent's motion to dismiss was in 
accordance with this Court's waiver doctrine, Utah Rule 
of Civil Procedure 65B(i) (2), and the Utah and United 
States Supreme Court cases above cited. 
- ,, 
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POINT VI. 
THE MOTION TO DISMISS WAS GRANTED PURSUANT 
TO UNIQUE HABEAS CORPUS RULES OF PROCEDURE 
AND THE MOTION TO DISMISS WAS NOT CON-
VERTED INTO A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Appellant asserts that post-conviction petitions 
for writs of habeas corpus are civil in nature and are governed 
by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. He then cites a 
. f h b . "1 2 ser1es o non- a eas corpus ClVl cases for the proposition 
that when a party files a motion to dismiss when there are 
issues of fact in dispute, or attaches affidavits or other 
factual material to his motion to dismiss, it is impermissible 
for a court, on its own initiative, to convert the motion to 
dismiss into a motion for summary judgment without at least 
allowing the opposing party the opportunity to present pertinent 
material. He claims that Judge Sawaya's ruling violated 
the holdings of these civil cases. 
Appellant's argument makes several unwarranted 
assumptions and inferences which are incorrect. He 
incorrectly assumes that habeas corpus cases are governed 
solelv by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure relating to 
2 Hill v. Grand Central, Inc., 25 Utah 2d 121, 477 P.2d 150 (1970); Harvey v. sana-ers; 534 P.2d 905 (Utah 1975); 
and Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Utah Farm Production, 587 P.2d 
151 (Utah 1978). 
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pleadings and motions; he incorrectly implies that 
respondent attached impermissible factual data to his motion 
to dismiss making a ruling thereon impossible; and he 
assumes that Judge Sawaya concluded that the respondent's 
motion to dismiss contained factual matter, and that the court 
therefore converted the motion to dismiss into a motion 
for summary judgment on its own initiative and ruled thereon. 
Respondent will show that each of these assumptions is 
incorrect. 
First, respondent agrees that post-conviction 
habeas corpus is a civil remedy which is generally governed 
by Utah's Rules of Civil Procedure. Burleigh v. Turner, 
15 Uta~ 2d 118, 388 P.2d 412, 414 (1964). However, it 
must be recognized that unlike a regular civil case (where 
motions to dismiss or motions for summary judgment are 
asserted at the earliest stage of the proceedings often 
after only an initial complaint has been filed commencing 
the ac~ion), a post-conviction habeas corpus action commences 
aftC'r nur.\crous prior court procc0dings hilvc already occurred 
constitutional challenges to lits penc1inc; or actual 
inc.\;·cL'rdtion. There has alrc•;_h-c\· ),,·en (1) prior Or:>-
portunity fo1: pl·c-trial motion"' ti.e., Sllf'prcssion 
hearin0~. challcn0us Lo the con~Litutionality of the 
- (! .1-
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statute under which the accused is charged, etc); (2) a prior 
criminal conviction where adjudication of facts and law has 
been made; and (3) prior appellate review of the petitioner's 
case. Thus, post-conviction habeas corpus cases are 
unique, quasi-criminal proceedings which are also governed 
by a specialized set of rules and procedures promulgatee 
by this Court through its rule-making authority 3 which 
are set forth in Rule 65B(i), and which have been 
supplemented by the case law of this Court. 
Rule 65B(i), unlike rules governing the filing of 
complaints in routine civil cases, additionally requires that 
the habeas corpus complaint (petition): 
1. Assert a substantial denial of constitutional 
rights; 
2. Identify the proceedings in which the complainant 
was convicted; 
3. Set forth in plain and concise terms the 
factual data constituting each and every manner in which the 
comolainant claims that anv constitutional rights were 
·:iolat2d; 
4. Have attached thereto affidavits, copies of 
records, or other evidence supporting each allegation, or 
shall state why the same are not attached; 
-65-
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5. State whether the conviction has been 
reviewed on appeal, and, if so, identify such appellate 
proceedings and state the results thereof; 
6. State whether the legality or constitutionality 
of his commitment or confinement has already been adjudged 
in a prior habeas corpus or other similar proceedings. 
Rule 65B(i) (2). 
Thus, habeas corpus complaints must be much more 
comprehensive than thosP in regular civil cases. The 
petitioner must explain the grounds for the complaint, 
and demonstrate to at least a threshold degree, their 
substance tnrough su:)?Orting ottachments, etc. Mere 
naked, unsunpol·ted allegations or legal conclusions do not 
satisfy this requirPment. Rather, the petitioner has a 
burden to make an initial showing of merit, and must 
provide the reviewing court with certain information so that 
a determination may be made b)· the court whether the petition 
is frivolous, whether issues raised have been oreviously 
adjudicated, or \vhctllc>r they are excluded by the wiliver 
r.._,sponsivc pleaciin.:. Pule 6:Jb(i) (2). (Also s~e the Rules 
qov0rnin0 f~ci~ral ~rits of habeas corpus under 28 li.S.C.: 
§ 2 2 ') 4 , \v h i c h p n> 
l"L"'C1Lli!."il1,1 Z1:l';. !)l\'-l 
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Thus, a determination of the applicability of 
Utah's waiver doctrine may clearly be made by the court 
based on the face of the habeas corpus pleadings and 
certainly without the entire record of any prior proceedings 
before the court as suggested by appellant. Given the 
comprehensive nature of the habeas corpus pleadings, the 
reviewing court may determine expeditiously that the 
petitioner appealed his conviction and raised certain 
issues on appeal. (Recall that Rule 65B(i) (2) requires 
the petitioner to identify the appellate proceedings and 
state the results). The court may, then, based upon an 
objective determination, summarily dismiss any issues 
which .it sees were previously adjudicated on appeal. 
LikePi~.c, " subjective determination may be made whether the 
issnccs now raised in the compluint could or should have 
been raised on direct appeal, and if so, determine that they 
are exc:luded by the waiver doctrine. 
In the instant case, "i-'J'c·llant failed to completely 
!_)rovide the court with the infon''''l io11 required by Rule 
65B(i) when he filed his complailll. Thus, when respondent 
filed lu ,- motion to dismiss, he ;; < I i!Chcd copies of the 
rcquisi tP documents contemplatr c 1•y Hul c 6~ (i), to-wit: 
copi0." r•f prior decisions of th ''i ilh and United States 
Supn~mC' C:at!rts and briefs filcc'l I•\' til(' respective parties 
G I 
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in those actions. These documents clearly provided ample 
basis for the court to determine that the issues raised in 
appellant's complaint either were raised or could have been 
raised on direct appeal. Moreover, appellant was accorded 
the opportunity at the hearing on respondent's motion to 
dismiss to rebut the applicability of the waiver doctrine 
and explain why the issues in his petition were not raised 
on appeal. Obviously, the court found the appellant's 
arguments (excuses) unpersuasive. 
Appellant collaterally asserts that Judge Sa~aya 
must have the entire record of 9rior proceedings before him 
"in order to make a determination that the raising of an 
issue is foreclosed by the doctrine of res judicata," citing 
Parrish v. Layton City Corp. 542 P.2d 1086 (Utah 1975), 
(another non-habeas corpus civil case) . Appellant has confused 
the doctrine of res judicata with the unique habeas corpus 
doctrine of waiver and thus the case is inapplicable. 
(See respondent's argument in No. 16168, Point I. C., pp. 
18-25). Moreover, given the drastic difference between the 
extent and scope of the pleadings in habeas corpus as 
opposed to regular civil pleadings, the case has 
little applicat~on. Also, it should be noted 
that in Parrish a summary judgment was reversed and 
the matter rcman(lc:l. br,cause ". [a] survey of the 
record (revealed) that the defendant never submitted a 
(Emphasis ,~:1c1r·c1). The 
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clear implicationofParrish is that a determination of res 
judicata (assuming the doctrine were applicable), may be aade 
without an evidentiary hearing when the court has the 
pleadings and judgment from the previous proceeding before it, 
which was the situation in the instant case. 
Moreover, it is difficult to see how a copy of the 
complete record of this case, presumably including the 5000 
page trial transcript and hundreds of exhibits, would have 
had any relevance to a determination of the waiver doctrine 
issue. The only critical question was whether the issues 
raised in the habeas corpus complaint were or could have 
been raised on appeal. Judge Sawaya did not have to go 
beyond the face of the pleadings in reaching his decision on 
the waiver doctrine, and thus could properly rule on 
respondent's motion to dismiss without converting it into a 
motion for summary judgment. In doing so, he made a 
determination of the legal insufficiency of appellant's 
claims because relief could not be granted thereon due to the 
waiver doctrine. 
Thus, appellant's sole reliance upon non-habeas 
corpus civil cases iscertainly misplaced. Appellant 
quotes Strand v. Associated Students of Univ. of Utah, 561 
P.2d 191 (Utah 1977) for the proposition that, "It is error 
to consider a motion to dismiss as a motion for summary 
judqment without qiving the adverse party an opportunity 
-69-
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to present9ertinentmaterial." Brief of appellant at 12. 
Respondent asserts that appellant was given an opportunity 
to "present pertinent material" by submitting it to the 
court in his petition for writ of habeas corpus; indeed, he was 
required to do so by Rule 65B(i) (2). His failure to 
support his petition with perti~ent material was an additional 
basis for the granting of the motion to dismiss. Appellant 
should not be allowed to demand a subsequent opportunity 
to present evidence on a claim that he has failec to state 
in the first place. The court in Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 
supra, also suplc' •t-;:.s respondent's argument that appellant's 
opportunity to present material evidence of his claims was 
in his petition by stating, "Fourteen months is sufficient 
time in which to assemble evidence for collateral review 
proceedings." 578 F.2d 591, n. 11. ~ppellant had twelve 
months in which to assemble the evidence for his petition 
for writ of habeas corpus in the instant case. (November, 
1977 to NO\'ember, 1978, the date hie; appeal was decided 
by this Co~~t to t~e date of the filing of his petitio~ in 
Third District Coc;~;:). 
In concl'"lsion, n•·3f)OnJcnt sub·-nits that appellant 
has failed to n•coj:1izc the• unique noturc of habeos corpus 
procccdinqs and t 1cC' concomi t:~r•t ruJ cs of rroccdurc \·,•hich 
,'(l-
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distort the actual mechanics of Judge Sawaya's granting 
of the motion to dismiss and attempt to apply the 
doctrine of res judicata where it is wholly inapplicable. 
As previously shown, res iudicata is generally conceded to 
be unavailable in habeas corpus. Fay v. Noia, supra. The 
two principles of habeas corpus procedure that respondent 
asserts are applicable are (1) a special, rigid set of 
rules and burdens of pleading placed on a petitioner by 
Rule 65B(i), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and (2) the 
waiver doctrine (not res iudicata) . Therefore, the 
procedure employed by Judge Sawaya in this case was properly 
grounded in Utah rules, statute, and case law. A motion 
to diSHtiss, not a motion for summary judgment, was granted 
pursuant to valid authority and based upon adequate in-
formation supplied by the pleadings and oral argument of 
counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, respondent submits that 
Judge Saway~'s order granting respondent's motion to dismiss 
and denying appellant a stay of execution was sound based 
upon the application of this Court's waiver doctrine that 
issues which were or could have been raised on direct 
appeal may not subsequently be caised in a post-conviction 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
- 7}_ 
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Moreover, appellant failed to raise any claim upon 
which relief could be granted due to the vague and 
speculative nature of the claims, and the added fact that he 
may not benefit from a retroactive application of the new 
case law he relied upon in support of his petition. 
Finally, this Court should affirm the lower court's 
ruling inasmuch as the Utah death penalty statutes remain 
constitutionally sound in light of recent United States 
Supreme Court decisions, and should uphold the dismissal 
of appellant's claim of arbitrary and capricious application 
of the death pen~lty inasmuch as it lacks legal merit. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
ROBERT R. WALLACE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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